In the years between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, Gazit was one of the American embassy’s points of contact in the Israeli government. Two telegrams published in the FRUS series show this quiet work: receiving positions, clarifying them, and protecting Israel’s interest in the details of procedure.
On 26 August 1970, a few weeks after the ceasefire that ended the War of Attrition, the embassy’s deputy chief of mission presented Washington’s position to him: Egypt was not entitled to move missile batteries within the standstill zone. In the same conversation he conveyed Egypt’s allegations of Israeli violations, suggesting they be passed to the military authorities for consideration.
On 23 April 1971, days after Golda Meir handed the Americans Israel’s proposal for a Suez Canal arrangement, a written American reply arrived. Gazit gave the U.S. official a short, precise statement: Israel would discuss the matter with the Ambassador the following week, and asked that no document be delivered to Egypt. It is an example of a hand setting the pace — not allowing an unagreed text to go out into the world.[FR70][FR71B]