In March 1975, Henry Kissinger shuttled between Jerusalem and Aswan in pursuit of a second interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. Gazit sat on the Israeli negotiating team alongside Rabin, Yigal Allon, Shimon Peres, Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur and Foreign Ministry Director-General Avraham Kidron. The memoranda of those meetings, held at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, show him as the keeper of the texts and the facts.
On the morning of 19 March, at the Prime Minister’s Residence, Rabin opened with a question: “Do we have all the formulations, Gazit?” — “Yes, we have it,” he replied. When Dinitz mentioned President Nixon’s letter, Gazit supplied the date at once: July 1971. At the same meeting Kissinger recounted telling Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy, that Gazit could draft the clause; Fahmy, he said, replied that Gazit was “too sensible” and that it had to be the legal adviser, Meir Rosenne. The room laughed. Sisco told Gazit it was a real compliment, and Allon added that when you get a compliment from Fahmy, you had better think again.
Other memoranda from the same round record the same role. When Kissinger asked whether the armistice agreements had lasted 19 years, Gazit corrected him: “Eighteen.” When Rabin said he was not offering a legal formula, Kissinger replied: “Gazit will do that.” And when the discussion turned to how to announce the suspension of the talks, he advised that it be done in person. Gazit also sat in the final meeting, on the evening of 22 March in the Prime Minister’s office, where the shuttle was suspended. The memorandum records that as the group rose from the table, one of those present said: “It is a Greek tragedy.” Kissinger replied that this was what made it worse — each side, following the laws of its own nature, had reached an outcome that was perfectly foreseeable. Talks resumed that summer and led to the interim agreement signed in September.
Two more memoranda from the same round show his work up close. On 14 March, when Kissinger reported that Sadat was willing to let American firms in despite the Arab boycott, Gazit noted that it would be on a selective basis only: “Because out of 20, he could admit only two. The blacklist remains.” At the same meeting, having given up on agreeing language with Fahmy for the clause on renewing the UN force, Kissinger said: “Maybe Gazit can work out something.”
On 20 March — the morning Kissinger read to the Israeli team the stern statement on a “reassessment” of U.S. policy — Gazit handed Allon the draft of the non-use-of-force clause. When Kissinger remarked that the phrase “in the relations between themselves” had provoked an uproar from Fahmy, Gazit answered: “No. Take it out.” At the end of the discussion Rabin asked: “Let Gazit and Simcha work to prepare ourselves for the Cabinet meeting.” By the evening meeting, a revised text was on the table.[FD2][FD3][FR75][FD6][FD7]
Kissinger: On the boycott, he IS prepared to change the boycott. […] But he will let American firms in.
Gazit: On a selective basis.
Sisco: Correct.
Gazit: That is not so good. Not so very good.
Kissinger: Why?
Gazit: Because out of 20, he could admit only two. The blacklist remains.
Rabin: Do we have all the formulations, Gazit?
Gazit: Yes, we have it.
Kissinger: Fahmy said this has to be drafted by Rosenne. I said Gazit could have done it. He said no, Gazit is too sensible; it has to be Rosenne. [Laughter]
Sisco: [to Gazit] You have a real compliment.
Allon: [to Gazit] When you get a compliment from Fahmy, you’d better think again. [Laughter]
Kissinger: The phrase "in the relations between themselves" produced an uproar from Fahmy.
Allon: Wasn’t that in there before?
Gazit: No. Take it out.
Rabin: Let Gazit and Simcha work to prepare ourselves for the Cabinet meeting.